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Abstract. This paper reflects on Human Factors Integration (HFI) to consider how 
Human Factors/Ergonomics has influenced Defence activities, and could influence 
safety and performance in Healthcare activities. A workshop with 16 Chartered Institute 
of Ergonomics & Human Factors members was held in July 2016 to discuss and 
propose a Route Map for HFI in the UK National Health Service. The results set out 
achievable targets for 1, 5, 10 and 20 years culminating in mandatory HFI to achieve a 
resilient system for safety culture and work load. 
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1. Introduction 
 
‘First, do no NET harm’ (Sokol, 2013). 
 
How has healthcare safety gone so wrong? At least 10% of patient admissions may 
result in some form of harm (Kohn, Corrigan, and Donaldson, 2000; Department of 
Health, 2000). Sokol (2013) revisited the Latin phrase ‘primum non nocere’ (First, do 
no harm), suggesting that a revision to ‘no net harm’ would be a more accurate 
expectation. For many clinical procedures there will be a level of harm, e.g. 
chemotherapy and surgery, but the ‘clinician’s hope is that the benefits will outweigh 
the harms’.  
In the UK National Health Service (NHS) there was relatively little management focus 
on safety until the 1990s. A change in the law, the removal of Crown Immunity from 
prosecution (Seccombe, 1995), meant that the NHS had to comply with safety 
legislation.  For example, hospitals and other care locations were now places of work 
under the Health and Safety Act, 1974, (Hignett et al., 2016). The interest in safety 
moved from staff to patients after the Bristol heart scandal (Department of Health, 
2002) but has continued to suffer dysfunction and artificial dichotomy.  For example, 
where staff or occupational safety may be managed by one Executive Director, e.g. 
Operational Services or Human Resources, and patient safety by another, usually 
clinical, Nursing or Medical. The latter is often subsumed within the NHS tradition of 
quality improvement (Hignett et al., 2015).  
 
In the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), Human Factors and Ergonomics has been 
present since the 1940s (Newman et al., 2008, Waterson, 2011). Human Factors 
Integration (HFI) in UK Defence activities has been discussed, implemented, reviewed 
and improved since the 1980s based on the US MANPRINT (Manpower and Personnel 
Integration) programme (MOD, 1989) and through significant collaboration between 
international allies to compare best practice.  
 
 
HFI is defined by the MOD as ‘the systematic process for identifying, tracking and 
resolving human related issues ensuring a balanced development of both technological 
and human aspects of capability’ (MOD 2015). The integration refers to: 
1. The integration and management of Human Factors with other engineering 
disciplines; 
2. Between Human, Machines and Organisations; 
3. Across 7 HFI domains (Manpower, Personnel, Training, Human Factors 
Engineering, System Safety, Health Hazards; Social & Organizational (MOD, 
2015a&b); 
4. Within the system acquisition process (Newman et al., 2008). 
Most recently, two directive and guidance documents for HFI have been published 
(MOD 2015a&b) as Joint Service Publications (JSPs) to provide the ‘policy 
requirements and comprehensive practice guidance for undertaking HFI’.  MOD staff 
are directed to include HFI in all Defence acquisition projects including ‘technology 
demonstrators, upgrades, software intensive, collaborative, non-development item 
solutions and projects dependent up on off-the-shelf items’; and to ensure that the HFI 
activities are carried out ‘effectively, efficiently and at appropriate times in a project’. 
The intended use is both for MOD staff and for ‘other parties, such as the Solution 
Provider’.  There is a clear description of successful achievement of the directive where 
‘satisfactory integration of the Defence Capability, Equipment Component and Human 
Component will be realized when the solution: 
1. Makes best use of human capabilities (physical, cognitive, psychological, and 
social characteristics) 
2. Recognizes and provides for human needs 
3. Provides mitigations for human limitations 
4. Applies to all people (end users) involved in the operation of the system 
5. Utilises people in ways that maximize system safety 
6. Utilises people cost-effectively 
7. Controls through-life cost’. 
There is also clear guidance about Human Factors (and Ergonomics) expertise as the 
‘Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person (SQEP)’ to undertake HFI activities with 
specific reference to a minimum requirement for Technical Membership of the 
Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors (CIEHF). This applies to those 
managing Human Factors work, with requirements set for SQEP within specific areas 
e.g. air platforms, to conduct and sign off Human Factors work. Broadly, where SQEP 
requirements have been set, they are at Chartered practitioner level i.e. equivalent to a 
Chartered Engineer. For example, Dstl, who conduct Independent Test Evaluator 
activities for Lightning II, require Chartered practitioner status as a part of the SQEP for 
that role. 
Over the last 30 years there have been many appeals for cultural change in the NHS 
with some success ‘in changing some of the surface manifestations of medical culture 
… [but] less successful in penetrating the deeply entrenched values and beliefs (and 
power bases) that underpin clinical practice’ (Davies, Nutley and Mannion, 2000).  It is 
likely this will continue with new initiatives at least every 5-10 years to restructure at 
national and local levels. However, despite pockets of good practice there seems to have 
been relatively little progress in embedding safer practice, technology and changing 
culture (Bagian, 2012; Shekelle et al., 2013; Dixon-Woods et al., 2014). This includes a 
 
 
lack of engagement with safety scientists (including Human Factors/Ergonomics 
specialists) in contrast to other safety critical industries when tackling entrenched safety 
challenges (MOD, 2008; Office for Nuclear Regulation, 2014; Office of Rail and Road, 
2008).  
This paper presents the results of a workshop with 16 CIEHF members in July 2016 to 
discuss and propose a Route Map for HFI in the UK National Health Service. 
 
2. Method  
 
At the CIEHF Annual Conference in 2016 it was said that ‘there’s no forum for 
Healthcare and Defence to meet’ (KT) and that there were opportunities for knowledge 
transfer between the MOD and Department of Health to improve healthcare safety. 
CIEHF members were invited to a workshop at Loughborough University if they had 
relevant experience in healthcare and HFI in Defence and other industrial sectors. 
Introductory presentations outlined the current challenges in healthcare (SH; Hignett et 
al, 2015; Hignett, 2015) and how HFI has been developing in Defence (WT), and other 
sectors such as nuclear, including the most recent directive and guidance from the MOD 
(2015a&b). 
As a practitioner workshop, the data collection was less robust than a more formal 
research approach but the intent was to discuss practitioner experiences and reflect on 
the best way forward for Healthcare i.e. in line with reflective practice as defined by 
Schön (2011). The discussion was recorded with field notes using post-its and flip 
charts. The results were reviewed by all participants with an opportunity to augment 
and/or edit the outputs. 
 
3. Results 
 
The results are reported as target achievements at four time intervals; 1 year (Figure 1), 
5 years and 10 years (Figure 2), and 20 years (Figure 3). 
By the end of year 1 the target achievements include: addressing perceived obstacles 
e.g. relationship between CIEHF and Clinical Human Factors Group; establishing the 
HFI framework, using MOD example; and engagement of key stakeholders. This would 
provide the platform to discuss and agree the vision (a clear message and aim) and plan 
for the way forward. The suggested success criteria at 12 months are defined domains 
and terms (MOD, 2015b).  
The defined domains could include ‘all aspects of human behavior, capability and 
limitations… e.g. from interactions with the physical environment to understanding 
cultural differences in groups.  Importantly the HFI domains are related to each other 
and should not be considered in isolation.  Any decision in one of the domains can 
easily affect any other domain.  For example, where the level of automation is 
increased, there may be a change required in staffing levels and vice versa’ (MOD, 
2015b, p4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. CIEHF – Clinical Human Factors Group (CHFG) to agree Service Level Agreement 
2. MOD HFI Framework as Goal Statement 
3. Determine key stakeholders as both consultation and endorsement roles including 
CHFG, Care Quality Commission, NHS Litigation Authority, NHS Improvement, 
Health Education England, NHS Scotland, Medical & Health products Regulatory 
Agency 
4. Determine clear message and aim 
5. Determine plan for way forward 
6. Show examples (case studies and safety cases) 
7. Competency matrix 
a. Suitably qualified/experienced person (HFE knowledge / experience) 
b. Who can do what?     
8. HFI success criteria: to have: 
a. defined domains 
b. defined terms 
 
Figure 1. HFI principles for Healthcare: Target achievements at Year 1 
 
At 5 years, assuming appropriate support e.g. from the National Centre for Human 
Factors Integration in Healthcare, the proposed target achievements would have 
embedded HFI in incident investigations to stop the identified reactive approach to 
human failure (Care Quality Commission, 2016). HFI and quality improvement projects 
and initiatives would be linked (Health Education England, 2016) with the HFI 
delivered by SQEP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. HFI principles for Healthcare: Target achievements at Year 5 (and continuing 
to Year 10) 
1. HFI applied systematically in incident reports 
2. Stop reactive approach to human failure 
a. Change to proactive – early in cycle 
3. HFI and Quality Improvement firmly linked at professional level [in 
healthcare] 
4. HFI involved in incident analysis (including root cause analysis) 
a. HFI as part of Coroners response 
5. HFI success criteria analysis 
6. HFI included in Care Quality Commission inspections 
7. Interim HFI tool kit – linked to suitably qualified and experienced 
person/personnel (SQEP) 
8. Investigate key tasks/ roles for HFE 
9. HFI in staff training  (start from 5 years and continue) 
10. CIEHF position on workload in healthcare 
a. Impacts on quality of care? 
11. Requirements for resilient healthcare system 
 
 
These targets would continue to Year 10 when it is proposed that the final tool kit (see 
Figure 2 (7)) should be available, including HFI linked to (and where appropriate, 
embedded within) quality improvement measures. The toolkit could include a range of 
HFI activities (MOD, 2015b, p.28) including: Task Analysis; Workload Analysis; Link 
Analysis; Information Flow Analysis; Allocation of Function, human-human and 
human-machine; Human Performance Analysis; and Human Reliability Analysis. This 
would be accompanied by: design activities e.g. modelling, simulation; software and 
hardware design; workplace and organization design; trials and experiments; training 
needs analysis, training design and delivery; and contributions to safety cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. HFI principles for Healthcare: Target achievements at Year 20 
 
At 20 years HFI should be mandatory in processes for audit, procurement etc. as it is 
currently in Defence, with a uniform approach across all healthcare providers e.g. JSP 
(MOD 2015a). The role of HFI providers (SQEP) will be clearly defined, embedded and 
auditable e.g. by CIEHF, to provide assurance in the same way as other professional 
regulators such as the General Medical Council, Nursing and Midwifery Council, 
General Pharmaceutical Council. 
Achieving these targets would enable healthcare to define and respond to specific 
challenges in a robust and systematic way. For example, the MOD (2015b) gives 
examples of Single Statements of User Need (SSUN) where a capability need or gap is 
identified from a capability audit.  The SSUN provides the scope of the User 
Requirements Document and summarises the description of HFI need for management 
purposes (Figure 4). 
 
Future Integrated 
Soldier Technology 
(FIST) 
FIST is to deliver the technology to support an Integrated 
Soldier System with a coherent and ergonomic ensemble of 
clothing, personal protection, load carriage, personal 
weapons, target acquisition systems and Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4) linked to a 
wider network, served by an integrated power management 
system, designed to minimise impact on agility, while 
maximising operational effectiveness in order to maintain 
battlefield superiority in Dismounted Close Combat in all 
environments out to 2035. 
 
Figure 4. Statement of User Need; summarizing the description of HFI need (MOD, 
2015b) 
 
1. HFI mandatory in processes for audit, procurement etc. 
2. HFI as uniform approach across all Trusts, sectors (primary, secondary, 
mental health, ambulance, community & home care) 
3. HFI competency matrix – clear, embedded and audited 
4. HFI capacity to deliver improved safety 
a. Resilient system for safety culture and work load 
 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Defence has had over 30 years to develop, discuss, embed, integrate and review HFI.  
Healthcare is only just starting on this journey so there will be challenges to reducing 
net harm.  The first step has already been taken with 16 healthcare agencies signing a 
statement ‘that a wider understanding of Human Factors principles and practices will 
contribute significantly to improving the quality (effectiveness, experience and safety) 
of care for patients’ (National Quality Board, 2013). 
By Year 5, the involvement of SQEP in Human Factors for incident investigation 
should be routine. It will answer and respond to the criticism by Peerally et al. (2016) on 
the failure of healthcare to utilise professional expertise but instead rely on root cause 
analyses for serious untoward events (including death) ‘typically conducted by local 
teams, not the expert accident investigators who are proficient in systems thinking and 
human factors, cognitive interviewing, staff engagement and data analysis that are 
characteristic of other high-risk industries’. 
We expect that HFI in healthcare will be complex but the need to improve safety and 
reduce harm is a priority for everyone involved in this sector e.g. patients, staff, visitors, 
contractors, NHS policymakers, board members, commissioners. The next step is a 
review and development of this Route Map through CIEHF and NHS collaboration at 
the Human Factors Exchange (https://hee.nhs.uk/hee-your-area/east-midlands/our-
work/attracting-developing-our-workforce/human-factors-exchange). 
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